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ABSTRACT
Quality and performance are very often the design drivers of engineers working on Space Projects. Reliability and
availability of space systems are requirements on a single unit. In case the unit fails or underperforms, the mission is
not accomplished or seriously compromised. The Quality Assurance has the task of making sure that the satellite
complies with the specifications and operates flawless for the entire life. In mass production, the role of Quality
Assurance is to minimize, not to eliminate, the number of defects. A certain number of defective units are
acceptable. They are repaired or replaced during the guarantee period.
How far are satellites from the point where the production cost is so low that replacing a defective unit is cheaper
than ensuring it is defective free? Once the satellite market has reached that point, we can say that quantity matters
more than quality. In recent years, space projects have seen the deployment of recurrent units for constellations, as
GPS, Iridium, Globalstar, and others. Still the number of recurrent units is too small to make a difference.
We still need to reach the point where satellites can be built and launched for a fraction of the present cost. Do
technologies and methodologies of small satellites play a role to reach the turning point where quantity makes the
difference? Is there any market requiring enough recurrent units to push down the development cost per unit to a
negligible level?
The paper analyzes the technology maturity of small satellites and shows how far small satellites are from the point
where the quantity matters more than quality. The work analyses market dynamics and how non-space technologies
may play a new role in deploying new space assets. The paper shows the pace at which space technologies are
approaching the turning point where quantity matters more than quality.

combination of training and best effort “to make it
work”.

INTRODUCTION
1,2

A large bibliography can be found on approaches to
build, design, test, and operate low cost satellites. The
challenges to built low cost satellites within a tight
budget and schedule a have taught the aerospace
community many lessons. Large Satellite Integrators
(LSI) and Institutions as NASA, US-DoD, France
DGA, and ESA, were initially sceptical about practical
applications of small satellites. In the early days of
small satellites they were seen as underperforming, not
yet proved, and of questionable reliability, good only at
keeping busy small communities of very green rocket
scientist. In those times small satellites were a territory
mainly occupied by Universities, small National
initiatives. The work done on small satellites were a
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Along the path of continuous growth of small satellites,
many communities came on board. In-flight proof that
“it does work, even better of what we expected” and the
shrinking budget for aerospace missions, make LSI and
Institutions looking at the Small Satellites as an
opportunity to make more with less.
What’s the present situation?
1. Very green rocket scientists are still busy with
small satellites;
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2. Large Satellites Integrators have complemented
their portfolio with a number of low cost small
platforms;

THE MOTIVATION/ABILITY FRAMEWORK
Aspects as the disruptive role of small satellites, their
technology evolution or breakthrough has been well
addressed in the past years in this conference, but we
still have limited capabilities to forecast markets
evolution and to identify what it’s the next opportunity.

3. Institutions have now stable small satellites
programs for complementing large missions or
dedicated to specific low cost missions;

The Motivation/Ability Framework3 is a two-by-two
matrix (figure 1). The Motivation are the opportunities
seen by the industrial players in a market, the Ability is
defined as the capability to offer products and services
that fulfill customer needs.

4. A few companies are now on the market delivering
small satellites or services using constellations of
small satellites.
5. The Small Satellite approach is cost effective and
quick way to verify concepts or to fill operational
gap.
Points 1, 2 and 3 are sharing the same market of the
early days: Institutional funds. Points 4 and 5 are the
sign that new markets are opening for small satellites.

High

Figure 1 - Motivation / Ability Framework

Motivation

Miniaturization, technology development and the better
knowledge on how to build and operate a low cost
satellite, made a larger number of applications possible,
extending the share of the small satellite market.
Surveys [paper presented USU 2008, session dedicated
at the last Berlin conference] confirm the trend of small
satellites enlarging the possible applications.
Knowledge on how to built small satellites improves
continuously, reducing cost and improving reliability of
the whole process. What will happen when we will be
able to build and deliver a satellite for a fraction of the
present cost? Is there any market [ref to the book
“seeing what’s next”] that will suddenly materialize
when the performance to cost ratio will overcome a
certain threshold?

The Hotbed

Companies need to
acquire the
technology to
develop their
capability.

Companies well
established in a
profitable market.

Market driven by
technology
innovation

Market driven by
technology
evolution.

Hic Sunt Leones

Looking for
opportunities

Companies are
unable to create and
exploit innovation in
this market.

Low

How this will change the way of designing, building,
launching and operating satellites?
Predicting what will happen for high technology
markets is not very easy; sometimes it is even
questionable to place a too large effort to predict a too
far future. Some Hi-Tec companies organize
themselves to follow the paradigm “don’t be smart, be
fast”. But even if our capability to envisage is limited
by the rapid and unpredictable evolution of the
technology, we still shall observe trends that may
provide some clues on how to do be ready to quickly
adapt to the forces of new markets.

Non-market, can
only be occupied by
synergic
technologies
Low

Companies
struggling to enter a
low end market.
Market occupied by
disruptive
technologies

Ability

High

The most interesting part of the market, for the scope of
this paper, is area with low motivation and low ability.
We called this area “Hic Sunt Leones”, an expression in
old maps for undiscovered territories. Hic Sunt Leones
on a map indicated an unknown and dangerous land.
We found this term very appropriate for the markets
requiring high technology but offering very low
profitability business. Those markets will be difficult to
enter and difficult to navigate, but may offer interesting
new opportunities. These markets will not exist if

Among all possible applications of small satellites we
focused on Earth Observation satellites, seen by the
Authors as one of the most dynamic market of small
satellites, both in term of market grow and technology
evolution.
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Target out of reach
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and opportunities to make synergic use of technologies
can open markets out of reach to private enterprises or
simply beyond our imagination. (We wonder who could
have imagined 30 years ago that today we could have
been able to find our way through the traffic by using
somebody else telephone).

synergies cannot be established among different types
of technologies and market. We would like to use an
examples somewhat related to space to explain the use
of the Motivation/Ability matrix.

GPS Navigation through the traffic
The Global Positioning System is a large infrastructure
developed the US DoD to guide USAF aircrafts over
territories not covered by Loran or other ground based
naviation systems.

THE STUDY CASE: EARTH OBSERVATION
SATELLITES
Can we use the same template to forecasts if nonmarkets for the small satellites for Earth Observation
will materialize? What type of technologies will be
needed to deliver new services and products?

GPS navigators are now a very common electrical
device. A large number of companies are present in the
market selling GPS navigator at a price affordable for
the mass market. None of the companies selling GPS
would have had the resources to develop the complex
GSP space infrastructure, and consequently sell
handheld devices for the consumer market. The GPS
case is an example how a Government driven
technology has generated market opportunities in an
area that is unaffordable to private investors.

Making this type of forecast goes well beyond the
capability (and the imagination) of the Authors, but we
can still observe what trends and forces are moving
Earth Observation satellites in the Motivation/Ability
matrix. Figure 2 reports the Motivation/Ability matrix
for Earth Observation (EO) satellites.

One more interesting evolution of GPS is the guidance
through the traffic. This service, recently offered by
Tom-Tom for a modest 10€ /month, gives the users
very accurate traffic information and suggestions on
possible detour. The information is obtained by mobile
telephone companies that retrieve traffic information by
monitoring the average speed at which the telephone of
their subscribers switch between cells along highways.

Figure 2

High

Motivation/Ability Matrix for EO Satellites

This example shows how the navigation systems can
deliver a service at a very affordable cost by
sinergically use a different technology and a
Government supported development. Tom-Tom
exploits a market that will not generate enough revenue
to pay back the investment for the whole infrastructure
of GPS and traffic monitoring. The traffic information
service on the Tom-Tom occupies the low motivation,
low ability part of figure 1.

Target out of reach

The Hotbed

New HiRes Earth
Observation
Systems for defense
and Environment

Earth Observation
Satellites for
Institutional Market

Motivation

Market driven by
technology
innovation

Market driven by
technology
evolution.
Looking for
opportunities

Hic Sunt Leones
Example: One
meter, one day
revisit on your PDA.

Low

A similar case is the “Personalized Weather Forecast”.
A number of companies offer personalized weather
forecast for a modest subscription fee. This service is
very useful to user that systematically need timely and
accurate weather forecast. Also in this case, this service
use government sponsored infrastructures, the weather
forecast service, in synergy with a different technology:
internet broadband. The use of mobile telephone
connected to a laptop make this service available also to
users located in remote areas.

Non-market, can
only be occupied by
synergic
technologies

Low

EO for customers
other than
Institutions (DMC,
HiRes Images)
Market occupied by
disruptive
technologies

Ability

High

In the above two examples we have seen as
Government driven technologies and infrastructures
Maresi

3

23rd Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

way the military, if not the intelligence community, does
business. TacSat-2 was launched with an experimental
one meter resolution imager and a fairly basic signals
intelligence payload.”

The Hotbed
Institutional Market is still one of the most important
markets of LSI of EO satellites. Applications as
weather forecast, defense, and environment monitoring
are demanding always increasing performance and
functionalities. Multibillion contracts are awarded by
governments for the procurement of space segments for
these applications. It is interesting to observe what is
the trend of the cost of EO satellites. As example we
would like to refer to Sentinel-2A. This satellite is a
multispectral high resolution satellite developed in the
frame of GMES. The cost of Sentinel-2A is 200 M€,
less than half of ERS-1, the 1st European remote
sensing satellite, launched in 1991, whose cost was
500M€. Remarkably, Sentinel 2B, a recurrent unit of
Sentinel-2A, is expected to cost 100M€, close to 1/10
of ERS-1, if costs are compared on current economic
conditions.

The Role of Institutional Missions: LSI and the
Complementary Missions
One of the driving forces of European Space Agency
(ESA) is geo-return: all ESA member states shall
receive contracts in proportion to the participation of
their Countries. With the vertical integration of LSI one
single company could build most of a satellite, making
more difficult to comply within a single mission to the
geo-return rule. A number of small satellites recently
developed within ESA as Smart-1, Proba helped to
balance the geo-return. Small missions are now seen by
the Agency as an opportunity to balance geo-return, to
give smaller companies a fair business opportunity, and
at the same time to complement large missions. This
opens a Government supported market of Small
satellites and push forward the know-how to develop
low cost satellites.

The trend of EO satellites becomes more evident when
comparing the evolution of the resolution. Landsat-1 in
launched in 1972 had a resolution of 100 meter, the
resolution of SPOT-1, launched in 1985 was 10 meters,
and Ikonos-2 launched in 1999 reached 1 meter. The
resolution of EO satellites improved a factor 10 every
12 years. The evolution of resolution and the reduction
of the cost of the space asset is decreasing the cost of
satellite data at an exponential rate.

Looking for Opportunities
Both ORS and ESA supported mission are
governmental forces helping industries building small
satellite. At the same time, National space programmes
traditionally in favour of small satellites, keep a role in
maintaining active lines of small satellites. Those
companies, presently supported by National
programmes, are looking for opportunities outside of
their counties and are learning how to thrive in the
lower part of the motivation.

The multibillion Institutional contracts to built Earth
Observation satellites resulted in developing the
capability to produce remote sensing data in a much
more cost effective way.

Moving Down from the Hotbed
The role of Governments: the ORS case
Entering the Land of Lions
The ORS requires fast response. USA DoD through
DARPA, and ARFL have supported a number of R&D
initiatives in order to shrink the development and the
AIV time of satellites. Small satellites have been the
natural test bench to understand what can be done to
minimize the “time to orbit”. The work done in the last
few years aimed at the development of standards that
will streamline the design, assembly, and verification of
satellites. Inevitably, this will translate in a cost
reduction and in more competitive products. How far
the performance of low cost EO satellite can go and
how cheap the satellite can be has been recently
demonstrated by TacSat-24:“…the Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) program is building and
launching a set of small, relatively inexpensive, and
technically innovative satellites that could change the
Maresi

TacSat-3 is one example on how Government
sponsored developments are preparing small satellites
to enter “the Land of Lions”: “- Four ideas with the
same name. - The first idea is the best known, to give
the combatant commanders direct access to, and
tasking authority over, a set of space assets. The second
goal is to change the economics of military space and
to get away from the extremely expensive—though
highly capable—intelligence satellites and replace them
with smaller specialized spacecraft, such as TacSat-3.
The third element is the drive to reduce the costs of
getting spacecraft into orbit. This is why the ORS
program has been so supportive of Elon Musk’s SpaceX
and their Falcon launchers, although they also are
using Orbital Sciences Corporation’s Minotaur that
4
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recycles old elements of Minuteman ICBMs. The fourth
and final idea is to push forward new technologies that
will allow the Defense Department to “surge and
replenish” satellite constellations and to do so quickly
and at a reasonable cost.3

and reliability of the service play an important role. In
this situation nobody is willing to trade on quality.
In a low motivation market that accepts a degraded
service provided that the cost of the information is
affordable, the Customer/Supplier relation will follow a
different scheme. One example is an in-orbit delivery
contract. The customer will only pay for the data once
he receives it, and if the service is “good value for the
money”. The development of an in-orbit delivery
suffers of the same problem of Tom-Tom traffic
navigation information. The cost of the infrastructure is
too high and the market motivation too undefined to
justify the risk of the investment. Digital Globe (www.
digitalglobe.com) and DMC (www.dmcii.com) have
already entered the market of delivering EO images
addressing two different market segments: Digital
Globe focuses on high quality high resolution, while
DMC is addressing a lower end of the market. Both
companies have invested in a constellation of a few
satellites. The users of data delivered by both
companies are institutions or companies.

The access to a non-market may result from a mix of
technology developments supported by Government
and disruption innovations in other fields. By
combining products and services that were out of reach
because their complexity and development cost can
offer the opportunity to enter a low end market.
Cost reduction of few orders of magnitude of
technology and the proper mix of available services
have in recent past created totally new markets, from
home computers, to mobile phones. How far the cost of
small satellite shall go down before we will see the
generation of a new market?
The TacSat program in the USA is just one example. A
number of initiatives in Europe both coordinated by
ESA (Proba series of small satellites) and at National
level (Miriades sponsored by CNES, and similar
initiative started by DLR) will produce a similar effect:
to reduce the barriers to enter the low Motivation/ low
Availability part of the plot by reducing the cost of
space asset.

We examined a possible evolution of the technology
and of the market: to broadcast in near real time high
resolution satellite images on a digital handheld device.
The reason for selecting this example is to apply the
model we described above and to verify if it is possible
to draw some conclusions. The motivation of the final
user to pay a high price is very low, and the cost of the
infrastructure (space segment + ground processing and
distribution) does not justify the investment. This
example is in the low Motivation low Ability section of
the Matrix. This is a non-market than may become
available only when forces external to the market will
play an important role. Again looking into the mix
Government supported activities and technology
evolution we can observe:

One of the cost drivers in satellites is the development
that usually accounts for 50% of the overall cost. In
case of recurrent units, even if built only a few years
after the first satellite, the development cost is still a
large percentage, because the obsolescence of EEE
components and upgrade of the design will re-inject
non recurrent costs. The cost of development of more
and more complex SW is another cost driver that is
becoming more important in recent EO mission. In
some missions, the development of the SW to handle
the amount of data produced by the increasing
capability of the satellites accounts for approximately
25%. Handling of data, from on-board data
compression to the ground analysis, archiving, and
retrieving facility is becoming a larger percentage of the
overall cost.

1. The bandwidth of personal communication as
internet connection and wireless access to internet
(as mobile phone based internet connection) is
growing at a surprising pace.
2. SW for image compression / decompression and
automatic feature recognition is evolving under
both government sponsored development and for
commercial uses.

Both of the above cost drivers can be reduced to a
fraction of the overall percentage when satellites are
produced in series, but the real breakthrough will
happen when it will be cheaper to replace a satellite
instead to ensuring it will work for its entire lifetime.
This will decrease the level of quality assurance on a
single unit, and therefore the cost of the satellite. The
major obstacle in replacing quantity with quality is
related to the current procurement process: the
Customer-Supplier relations are governed by
procurement contracts where performance, availability
Maresi

3. Defense related needs (situation awareness) and
fast response to natural disasters requires near real
time broadcast of HiRes Images. The timeliness to
process satellites image from acquisition to
availability to the user is constantly decreasing.
The cost of developing the technology and to
build the necessary on-ground infrastructures is
supported by Government funded projects.
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The elements to make possible to enter the “Hic Sunt
Leones” area are already present and are evolving at
fast pace. The event that may unlock the door to open
the non-market is the relation between the “in orbit
delivery” approach of mass market, and still the high
cost of the final infrastructure, in which the ground
segment plays a very important role. When it will be
possible to fulfill the request of “in-orbit” delivery of
remote sensing data the gap will be closed, the market
will reward by asking for a large quantity of
information more than their quality. In that moment it
will be possible to break the vicious circle1 high
reliability Æ high cost Æ lower n. of satellite Æ higher
reliability.
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The technology areas to be monitored to early
understand when the non-market of EO direct broadcast
of High Resolution images are:
1. Disruptive technologies for manufacturing low
cost high resolution Optics;
2. Disruptive Technologies in Detectors (large
areas CMOS);
3. Use of commercial grade detectors in Space
and/or large integration EEE components;
4. Development of image processing and data
compression dedicated hardware.
Another aspect to be monitored to understand to
potentialities of these products is to whom high
resolution images are sold. We have observed that the
market of high resolution images has followed the
evolution: Defence as first application, Government
institutions, now large companies are routinely
purchasing high-resolution EO satellites, when the cost
high resolution images will further decrease, a larger
amount of small companies will soon capable to afford
procurement of high resolution images. At that point,
we are one step from the mass market, where the user
will only see the cost per square kilometer of an image.
At that point quantity will matter more than quality. If
the application of the technology of direct image
broadcast developed by TacSat will have followed the
same market evolution, we will be very close to have
broken all the barriers of the non-market for near real
time high resolution on your PDA.

Maresi

6

23rd Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

